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“VOLUNTEERING” TO ARBITRATE
THROUGH PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
CLAUSES: THE AVERAGE CONSUMER’S
EXPERIENCE
LINDA J. DEMAINE* AND DEBORAH R. HENSLER**
I
INTRODUCTION
Private arbitration, enabled by predispute agreements whereby parties
waive their rights to resolve future disputes in a public courtroom, has a long
history in the United States.1 Until recently, arbitration reigned in two domains:
commercial transactions and labor-management relations. Businesspersons
generally chose arbitration over litigation for several reasons. First, they
preferred to select the people who would decide their disputes, often opting for
decisionmakers with relevant expertise, rather than having courts assign
generalist judges to their cases. Second, they tended to prefer resolutions based
on commercial norms rather than legal standards that might be less appropriate
for their disputes. Finally, they commonly anticipated that resolution by
arbitration would be quicker and cheaper than court resolution, with its
potential for protracted pretrial adversarialism, extensive discovery, and multiple appeals.
Labor unions and management included arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements for different, albeit overlapping, reasons. Both labor
and management believed that resolving disputes through arbitration would
minimize industrial conflict over worker grievances. They had more confidence
in decisionmakers whom they selected from their own ranks than courtappointed judges from outside the affected industries. Furthermore, they
wanted a conflict resolution process that would keep businesses running and
avoid losses in productivity and employment. In both the commercial and
labor-management domains, arbitration agreements were negotiated by sophis-
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ticated parties of approximately equivalent bargaining power who understood
the benefits and costs of their bargains.2
Over the past several decades, as a result of some remarkable lawmaking by
federal and state appellate courts, the profile of arbitration has changed dramatically.3 Arbitration is no longer the province of sophisticated participants.
Instead, individuals pursuing long-established statutory claims, such as those
brought under the federal securities4 and antitrust laws,5 and newer but longsought civil rights claims, including race, sex, age,6 and disability discrimination,7
may now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to have assented to a
predispute arbitration clause.8 Consumer claims have followed a similar course,
such that consumers who enter into contracts that substitute binding arbitration
for the public court system may be required to arbitrate disputes that arise in
the course of their relationships with service or product providers.9
The merits of this consumer arbitration jurisprudence have been debated
heatedly by members of the judiciary, legal commentators, commercial interests, and public advocacy groups. Perhaps most central to the debate are concerns that consumers do not fully understand the terms of these agreements,10
and that, even if they did, they cannot negotiate those terms, which are offered
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.11 In accordance with the current arbitration
jurisprudence, however, consumers are bound by the terms of these contracts
2. For the history of commercial and labor-management arbitration in the United States, see
BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE (1990); ROBERT
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (4th ed. 1991); William Jones,
Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193;
Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 FLA. L.
REV. 557 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“There is little doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] has given
it a scope far beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”).
4. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The issue in Gilmer was
age discrimination, but the language used by the Court would apply equally to race and sex discrimination. Specifically, as Congress did not “evince[] an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue,” id. at 26, in either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e (2000), or the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the same rule would be expected to apply to claims brought under
these statutes.
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
8. For a discussion of general trends in the expansion of mandatory arbitration beyond the commercial realm, see Jean Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
831 (2002).
9. On the expansion of mandatory arbitration into consumer contracts, see Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281, 284 (2002); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 190 (2003).
11. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 76.
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unless their terms are deemed unconscionable or otherwise faulty under general
principles of contract law.12
The debate surrounding consumer arbitration has lacked a strong empirical
foundation. For example, although it is generally believed that predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have become ubiquitous during the last
decade,13 discussions of the extent to which consumers are exposed to arbitration clauses have been driven by headline cases, investigations of specific industries, and broader, unsystematic searches.14 Also lacking is systematic information regarding the features of the arbitrations that are required by these clauses,
and what consumers are told about these features. Without such information, it
is impossible to determine whether arbitration is simply another forum in which
parties can freely pursue their legal rights, as the Supreme Court has held,15 or
whether consumers’ rights are being negatively and substantively affected without their true knowledge or consent.
The purpose of this Article is to help build the empirical foundation necessary for an informed debate regarding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
by providing preliminary insight into how businesses’ use of these clauses
affects consumers’ ability to pursue their legal rights. To this end, the Article
reports the results of a study investigating, in a wide variety of consumer purchases, the frequency with which the average consumer encounters arbitration
clauses, the key provisions of these clauses, and the implications of these clauses
for consumers who subsequently have disputes with the businesses they
patronize.

12. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (stating that, pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act, written provisions for arbitration are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”) (quoting 9
U.S.C. §2).
13. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 119 (1992);
M.D. Donovan & D.A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269, 269 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995); Stephanie
Armour, Consumers in Bind? Clauses Require Arbitration, Bar Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1998,
at 6B; Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at A1;
Michael G. Wagner, Private Judges Arbitrate More Consumer Suits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 3.
15. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”).
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II
METHODOLOGY
Data from the 1999 Annual Demographic Survey (March Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplement),16 published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and the Bureau of the Census, were used to create a statistical profile of the
average U.S. consumer. We grouped the CPS data by age (18 to 34, 35 to 54,
and over 55), gender, race (white, black, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Native
American/Eskimo), and family income (below median, above median). The
most populated cell, which accounted for approximately 11% of the U.S.
population, was comprised of white males, aged 35 to 54, with above median
incomes. We assigned these characteristics to our average U.S. consumer,17
whom we affectionately termed “Joe,” and placed him in Los Angeles, California.18
We selected the industries from which Joe made purchases on the basis of
two criteria. First, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Consumer Expenditure Survey to identify the categories of potential industries into which Joe’s
purchases would fall.19 Within these categories, we selected for study industries
from which Joe would make “important” purchases, which we defined as purchases that are expensive, ongoing, or have a potentially large impact on his life.
Table 1 lists the categories and industries studied. In total, thirty-seven industries were included.

16. These data are available at http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1999/sdata.htm (last revised Sept.
30, 1999).
17. We identified the average U.S. consumer to have an objective basis for deciding which categories of purchases to consider and to maximize the generalizability of the study’s results. An analysis of
the data reveals that 83.2% of the purchases attributed to Joe were from businesses that cater to the
average consumer, 11.2% were from businesses catering to those of high socioeconomic status (SES),
and 5.6% were from businesses catering to individuals of low SES. While the sample sizes are small,
the findings suggest that businesses catering to high SES individuals are the most likely to use arbitration clauses (50.0%), followed by those catering to the average consumer (35.1%) and, finally, those
catering to low SES individuals (11.1%).
18. We placed Joe in a precise geographic location to identify his purchases. We chose Los Angeles for both substantive and practical reasons. First, Los Angeles is the second largest metropolitan
area in the United States, consisting of a diverse conglomeration of businesses. Second, RAND is
located there, which facilitated data collection. Whether these results would replicate in other geographic locations is a question for future study. Differences between the California legal environment
and that of other states may cause businesses to behave differently. However, given that 81.4% of the
businesses surveyed operate both outside and inside California, and that a smaller percentage of the
California-only businesses used arbitration clauses (16.7%) than did the businesses that operate outside
and inside the state (39.7%), the results may generalize fairly well to other states, to the extent that
interstate businesses do not vary the use and content of arbitration clauses by state.
19. These categories consisted of food and alcohol, housing, apparel and services, transportation,
health care, entertainment, personal-care products and services, and personal insurance. See BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2000 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann00.pdf.
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TABLE 1:
INDUSTRIES SELECTED FOR STUDY
Category

Industry

Housing and
Home Services

Home Repair/Remodeling; Home Protection; Homeowners’ Insurance; Apartment Rental;
Renters’ Insurance; Moving; Real Estate; Long Distance Telephone Service;
Internet Service

Retail Services

Department Store; Online Retail

Transportation
Health
Food and Entertainment
Travel
Financial
Other

Auto Purchase/Lease; Gas Card;
Auto Insurance; Auto Repair/Maintenance
Hospital; Health Care Provider;
Health Insurance; Health Club
Grocery Store; Restaurant; Theme Park; Cultural/Sports Event
Airline; Auto Rental; Hotel; Travel Agent; Tour
Operator
Credit Card-General; Credit Card-Airline; Credit CardDepartment Store; Banking; Investment; Accountant/Tax Consultant
Attorney; Cell Phone; Life Insurance

The goal of the study was to investigate the arbitration policies of the businesses Joe was most likely to patronize. Our three-tiered sampling strategy for
identifying Joe’s purchases within the selected industries was therefore purposive, rather than strictly random. When Scarborough Research data were
available for a selected industry,20 they served as the criterion for sampling
businesses within that industry. Scarborough data were available for the following industries: auto purchase/lease, auto insurance, health insurance, airline,
auto rental, hotel, department store, Internet service, long distance telephone
service, cell phone, general credit card, airline-affiliated credit card,21 department store–affiliated credit card, banking, grocery store, restaurant, and theme
park. When Scarborough data were not available for a selected industry, but
the industry was dominated by a few businesses, we gathered information from
those dominant businesses.22 The following industries fit this profile: life insur20. Scarborough Research is a company that collects data on consumer purchases in selected markets throughout the United States. The Scarborough data used in this study relate the frequency with
which individuals in the Los Angeles area with Joe’s demographic characteristics make purchases from
businesses within particular industries.
21. Businesses in this industry are assumed to be the same as those in the airline industry.
22. Whether an industry was dominated by a few businesses was determined by a combination of
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ance, homeowners’ and renters’ insurance, travel, tour, moving, home protection, auto repair/maintenance, gas card, health club, real estate, hospital, and
investment. In the absence of both Scarborough data and industry domination
by a small number of businesses, we randomly sampled businesses within the
selected industries. Industries falling within this category include home
repair/remodeling, apartment rental, health care, accounting/tax consulting,
attorney/law, on-line retail, and cultural/sports events.
When Scarborough data were used, five businesses were sampled within
each industry, with the exception of the long distance telephone service (three
sampled)23 and general credit card (two sampled) 24 industries. When industries
were dominated by a small number of businesses, we sampled those dominant
businesses up to a maximum of five, with the exceptions of home protection
(one missing), investment (one missing), hospitals (two missing), travel agents
(three missing),25 and real estate agents (three missing).26 Finally, when businesses were randomly sampled, five were sampled within each industry, with
the exception of attorneys (three sampled). In all, we identified 167 businesses
for study and obtained information on use of arbitration clauses from 161 of
those.27 The data were collected in 2001 and reflect contract language for that
year.
The data reported in this Article were not easily collected. Many businesses
were not willing to participate in the study, although they were informed that
the data would be reported en masse without revealing businesses’ names;
others would not provide information even when the authors inquired in the
role of potential consumers. For many clauses, the authors sought assistance
from third parties who had retained their paperwork from recent purchases.
For others, the authors purchased products or services. For example, one
coauthor acquired four credit cards while conducting the study, as that was the
only means by which to obtain the clauses used by these businesses. Even when
businesses were legally bound to provide the information, it was not always as
industry data and physical presence in the Los Angeles area.
23. The fourth long distance company refused to participate, and information on its use of arbitration clauses was otherwise unavailable.
24. Excluding credit cards available through multiple sources, such as Visa and MasterCard, the
general credit card sample was limited to two companies.
25. Although only two large travel agencies were surveyed, neither used an arbitration clause, and
both reported that travel agents in the area do not use them. Accordingly, any arbitration clause
applying to the consumer as a result of patronizing a travel agency would result from the tour operator’s contract.
26. Only two very large brokers were surveyed; however, both used the same form arbitration
agreement and reported that the form is used statewide within the industry.
27. In four contexts, single businesses were sampled multiple times: (1) airlines were sampled once
for their use of arbitration clauses in airline tickets and again for airline-affiliated credit cards; (2)
department stores were sampled once for their use of arbitration clauses for store purchases and again
for store credit cards; (3) the businesses sampled for auto, life, homeowners’, and renters’ insurance
overlap substantially; and (4) the businesses sampled for Internet, long distance telephone, and cellular
telephone service overlap to a lesser extent. The total number of businesses sampled (161) reflects
these businesses being counted as one business each time they were sampled. The total number of
independent businesses sampled is 138.
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readily available as one might expect. The following exchange between one
coauthor and a long distance telephone service provider is illustrative:
Dear Customer Service Personnel,
I hope you can help me with the following question, as both my fiancé and I have asked
it of you more than once during the last few months and have received no answer. Specifically, we are wondering if an arbitration clause applies to our account. That is, is
there a clause that specifies that any dispute between us and [Company] has to be
resolved in arbitration rather than in court? Neither one of us is displeased with our
[Company] service, except for the failure to answer this question. We’ve asked the
question because I’m doing some research on dispute resolution.
Thank you.
Linda Demaine
Dear Ms. Demaine,
Thank you for contacting [Company] e-Customer Service. In regards to your . . . email, [Company] does not participate in any arbitrary disputes.
[Company] is committed to ensuring you make the most of your service. If you have
any additional questions or concerns, please visit On-line Account Manager at [Company URL].
Sincerely,
Melissa ______
e-Customer Service
Dear Melissa,
Thank you for your statement that [Company] does not participate in any arbitrary disputes. . . . My question did not address “arbitrary disputes,” but, rather, “arbitration
clauses.” Again, I would like to know if an arbitration clause applies to my residential
long distance account. Thank you.
Linda Demaine
Dear Ms. Demaine,
Thank you for contacting [Company] e-Customer Service.
In response to your e-mail, please reply with what the difference [sic] between an arbitrary dispute and an arbitration clause so we can better answer your question.
[Company] is committed to ensuring you make the most of your service. If you have
any additional questions or concerns, please visit On-line Account Manager at [Company URL].
Sincerely,
Michelle _____
e-Customer Service

28

28. The coauthor involved in this exchange subsequently explained the difference between arbitrary disputes and arbitration clauses to the customer service representative and was informed that no
arbitration clause applied to her account.
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These data-collection challenges are also likely to be faced by consumers
who attempt to learn about businesses’ use of arbitration clauses.
III
RESULTS
Across the industries studied, fifty-seven of the 161 sampled businesses
(35.4%) included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. (See Table
2.)29 The prevalence of arbitration clauses is highest (69.2%) in the financial
category (credit cards, banking, investment, and accounting/tax consulting), and
lowest (0) in the food and entertainment category (grocery stores, restaurants,
theme parks, and cultural/sports events). This pattern is not surprising, as the
financial category is characterized by industries that rely heavily on written contracts, often for ongoing services, whereas the food and entertainment category
is characterized by industries that engage in isolated transactions with no written contract between businesses and consumers. A similar pattern holds to
some extent across industries. The auto insurance and health insurance industries, for example—both of which typically provide ongoing services under written contract—are more likely to require arbitration than are the auto
repair/maintenance and health-care–provider industries. This pattern is not
universal, however. For example, none of the home protection companies and
only one health club surveyed required arbitration, although consumers usually
contract in writing for these ongoing services.30 Customary practice and industry regulations likely explain some of the patterns found.

29. The auto, homeowners’, and renters’ insurance contracts referred to “appraisal” rather than
“arbitration.” They are included in the results because, under California law, agreements to appraise
are treated as agreements to arbitrate. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (2003) (“‘Agreement’ [as
used in this title] includes but is not limited to agreements providing for valuations, appraisals and
similar proceedings . . . .”).
30. Overall, 55.1% of businesses that offer an ongoing product or service and use a written contract
included an arbitration clause, whereas only 9.4% of businesses that provide a one-time product or
service without a written contract did so.
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TABLE 2:
PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES, BY INDUSTRY

Category
Housing and Home Services
Home Repair/Remodeling
Home Protection
Homeowners’ Insurance
Apartment Rental
Renters’ Insurance
Moving
Real Estate
Long Distance Service
Internet Service
Retail Services
Department Store
Online Retail
Transportation
Auto Purchase/Lease
Auto Repair/Maintenance
Gas Card
Auto Insurance
Health Care
Hospital
Health Care Provider
Health Insurance
Health Club
Food & Entertainment
Grocery Store
Restaurant
Theme Park
Cultural/Sports Event
Travel
Airline
Auto Rental
Hotel
Travel Agent
Tour Operator

Number of
Number Using
Percentage
Businesses
Arbitration
Using ArbitraSampled
Clause
tion Clause
35
13
37.1
5
2
3
0
4
4
5
1
4
3
4
0
2
2
3
0
5
1
10
3
30.0
5
0
5
3
20
10
50.0
5
1
5
0
5
4
5
5
17
6
35.3
2
0
5
0
5
5
5
1
20
0
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
22
3
13.6
5
0
5
0
5
0
2
0
5
3
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Financial
Credit Card - General
Credit Card - Airline
Credit Card - Store
Banking
Investments
Accountant/Tax Consultant
Other
Attorney
Cellular Telephone
Life Insurance
Total

26
2
5
5
5
4
5
11
3
5
3
161

[Vol. 67:55

18
2
4
3
3
4
2
4
2
2
0
57

69.2

36.4

35.4

Of the fifty-seven businesses sampled that use arbitration clauses in their
consumer contracts, we obtained clauses from fifty-two.31 We analyzed the main
features of each of these clauses, focusing on those features that are most likely
to determine consumers’ understanding of arbitration and its implications for
the resolution of disputes with a business, and on those with the greatest
potential to influence consumers’ ability to pursue or defend a claim against a
business.
A. Scope of Arbitration Clause
In reviewing the scope of the arbitration clauses, we focused on four dimensions: (1) the subject matter of the disputes covered; (2) any provision for the
consumer or the business to seek interim relief from a court prior to an arbitration decision; (3) any exemption of small claims actions from the arbitration
requirement; and (4) any preclusion of class actions within required arbitrations.
1. Subject Matter of Dispute
Thirty-four of the fifty-two arbitration clauses (65.4%) apply to all disputes
that arise under the contract. Fifteen of these (28.8%) explicitly reach beyond
the contract in some manner, sometimes in multiple ways. Nine of the clauses
apply to prior agreements between the business and the consumer, and an additional two apply to at least some preexisting disputes between the consumer
and the business (regardless of whether there was a prior agreement between
the consumer and business). Nine of the clauses apply to relationships that
result from the agreement. One clause applies to related purchases. Four apply
to any dispute between the business and the consumer, and one applies to
“[a]ny subject matter whatsoever.” In addition, many of the clauses do not constrain themselves to disputes between the consumer and the business, and thus
31. The missing clauses are as follows: health insurance (3), home repair/remodeling (1), and
homeowners’ insurance (1).
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may be interpreted to apply to third parties who are not signatories to the
agreement.
The remaining eighteen clauses (34.6%) apply only to certain classes of disputes. An Internet service provider and a cell phone company exempt disputes
involving the consumer’s failure to pay billed charges. An apartment lessor’s
clause applies only to personal injury and property damage claims (thus
exempting unlawful detainer actions). The two real estate brokers exempt
numerous actions, including foreclosure proceedings, unlawful detainer actions,
and matters within the jurisdiction of a probate or bankruptcy court. Eleven
insurance clauses cover only disputes regarding the amount the insured is entitled to recover, sometimes under a particular section of the policy. An accountant limits the clause’s application to fee disputes in divorce cases. And an
attorney states that the clause applies only to claims concerning the performance of services.
2. Provision for Interim Relief
Ten of the fifty-two clauses (19.2%) provide for some form of interim relief
from a court, including injunction, sequestration, attachment, garnishment,
repossession, replevin, appointment of a receiver, or any other provisional remedy relating to “any collateral security or property interests for contractual
debts owed by either party to the other under the agreement.” Eight of these
clauses state that the provisional remedy may be exercised by either the consumer or the business, whereas two allow for only the business to do so.
3. Small Claims Exception
Sixteen of the fifty-two clauses (30.8%) exempt small claims from the arbitration requirement. Half of these clauses state that either party may pursue an
action in small claims court; the other half state that the business will refrain
from invoking the clause if the consumer pursues an action in small claims
court.32
4. Class Action Preclusion
Sixteen of the fifty-two arbitration clauses (30.8%) explicitly prohibit class
actions within the arbitration proceeding, and none of the remaining clauses
explicitly provide for class actions.
The claims covered by the clauses are summarized in Table 3.

32. This exclusion may reflect a considered judgment by businesses that, however inexpensive or
expeditious arbitration may be, it will nevertheless require more time and resources than resolving a
dispute in small claims court. Whatever the actual transaction-cost differences may be, businesses do
not face significant exposure in small claims courts. See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey,
Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219,
235-43, 247-54 (1975); see also Susan Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 55, 1 & n.11 (1993).
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TABLE 3:
SCOPE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Claims Covered
All claims arising under contract
Claims beyond immediate contract
Provision for interim relief
Small claims exemption
Class action preclusion

Number
34
15
10
16
16

Percent
65.4
28.8
19.2
30.8
30.8

B. Notice that Consumer is Waiving Right to Court
Twenty-nine of the fifty-two clauses (55.8%) state that consumers are
waiving their right to resolve a dispute through the court system. (See Table 4.)
Two additional clauses (3.8%) state only that consumers are giving up the right
to a jury trial, and another (1.9%) simply states that consumers are giving up
the right to proceed in any other forum. The remaining twenty clauses (38.5%)
are silent on what rights consumers are waiving.33
TABLE 4:
NOTICE TO CONSUMER
Waiving Right to . . .
Court
Jury trial
Any other forum
No mention that consumer is waiving right

Number
29
2
1
20

Percent
55.8
3.8
1.9
38.5

C. Providers and Rules of Arbitration
The U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts have interpreted arbitration statutes to allow contracting parties to decide what rules should govern
arbitration proceedings, subject only to the general proviso that arbitrators
must be unbiased and uncorrupted.34 Consequently, arbitration clauses may
vary greatly in the amount of information they convey to consumers about what
arbitration is or what consumers can expect if they participate in an arbitration.
In the present study, we focused on the following fundamental points regarding
33. This silence is puzzling given the holding by the California Court of Appeals, in Badie v. Bank
of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998), that “to be enforceable, a contractual waiver of the
right to a jury trial ‘must be clearly apparent in the contract[,] and its language must be unambiguous
and unequivocal, leaving no room for doubt as to the intention of the parties.’” Id. at 289 (quoting
Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Ct. App. 1991)).
34. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 479 (1989);
Ebasco Constrs. v. Ahtna, 932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska 1997); Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1992).
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arbitration providers and rules of arbitration: (1) which organization will provide the arbitration; (2) the qualifications of the arbitrators; (3) the method for
selecting the arbitrators; and (4) the rules of procedure governing the arbitration.
1. Providers and Rules Generally
Thirty-six of the fifty-two clauses (69.2%) designate the entity that will conduct the arbitration. (See Table 5.)35 Twenty-nine of these clauses designate a
single entity as the arbitration provider: nineteen specify the American Arbitration Association (AAA), five specify the National Arbitration Forum (NAF),
two specify JAMS, two investment companies designate the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and one health insurer names a local law
firm. Seven additional clauses provide for a choice by the party initiating the
arbitration among two or more possible providers: six allow the party to choose
between two or more of the aforementioned providers, and one investment
company offers the NASD or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), unless
the consumer prefers the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
Fourteen of the clauses that specify an arbitration provider also specify the
rules that will govern the arbitration proceeding, such as the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules or the AAA Wireless Industry Association Rules. In other
cases in which a provider organization is specified, the organization’s consumer
or other applicable rules presumably would govern.36 Seven of these clauses
address the implications of a conflict between the clause and the arbitration
provider’s rules. Each of these clauses states that, in the event of a conflict
between the two, the arbitration clause will govern.
Sixteen clauses (30.8%) are silent on both who will conduct the arbitration
and what rules will apply.

35. A few companies specified that a particular provider’s rules would be used but did not explicitly designate a provider. These companies are treated as having specified the provider whose rules
they designated.
36. The health insurance clause that designates a particular law office as arbiter states that the governing rules of procedure are developed by the law office, in conjunction with the business and an advisory committee.
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TABLE 5:
SPECIFICATION OF ARBITRATION PROVIDER
Arbitration Provider
Specified
AAA
NAF
JAMS
NASD
Choice of two or more of above
NASD or NYSE
Other
Not specified

Number
36
19
5
2
2
6
1
1
16

Percent
69.2
36.5
9.6
3.8
3.8
11.5
1.9
1.9
30.8

2. Qualifications and Selection of Arbitrator
Eight of the fifty-two clauses (15.4%) specify the arbitrators’ qualifications.
These clauses require that the arbitrators be retired judges or practicing lawyers, often with a stated minimum number of years of experience in law generally or in the area of law governing the dispute. Fourteen of the fifty-two
clauses (26.9%) explain how the arbitrators will be selected. All but one
provide that the consumer and the business each will select an arbitrator and
that these two arbitrators will select a third, with almost half of these providing
that a judge of a court that would have had jurisdiction over the dispute in the
absence of the arbitration clause will choose the third arbitrator if the selected
two are unable to agree on a third. The remaining clause provides for a single
arbitrator to be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or, if this is not
possible, by the selection rules of the stated arbitration provider.
3. Procedural Rules
Seventeen of the clauses (32.7%) discuss discovery, and eleven (21.2%) discuss evidentiary standards. In most instances, these clauses alert consumers
that discovery may be limited and evidentiary standards may be relaxed by
comparison to litigation. Twelve of the clauses that address discovery convey
that discovery may or will be limited. Three state that no discovery will be
allowed. The remaining two specify that local discovery rules will apply. Three
of the clauses that address evidentiary issues state explicitly that neither federal
nor state procedural or evidentiary rules will apply, and another two state that
evidentiary standards in arbitration may be less rigorous than in court. Three
provide that either the Federal Rules of Evidence or state and local rules of
evidence will apply. The remaining three convey partial evidentiary guidelines
for the arbitration—for example, by stating that the arbitrator may compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at the hearing.
Thirteen of the clauses (25.0%) address whether arbitrators must issue written opinions. Three of these clauses specify that arbitrators will provide the
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reasons for their decisions in writing, whereas four state that arbitrators will not
do so. Another five clauses state that arbitrators will provide a written opinion
at the request of either party, and one states that arbitrators will do so at the
request of the parties.
Seven of the fifty-two clauses (13.5%) provide that at least some aspect of
the arbitration will be confidential. Three clauses preclude the parties from
disclosing the existence, content, or result of the arbitration without the consent
of all parties. Two preclude discussions with outside parties—one regarding the
arbitration proceedings and the other regarding the arbitration award. Another
two merely refer to “confidential arbitration.”
None of the clauses restrict parties’ rights to representation at any stage of
the arbitration process.
The arbitrator and procedural rules are summarized in Table 6.
TABLE 6:
ARBITRATOR AND PROCEDURAL RULES

Rules Regarding . . .
Arbitrator qualifications
Arbitrator selection
Discovery
Evidence
Written decision
Confidentiality

Number of Clauses
That Describe
This Feature
8
14
17
11
13
7

Percent
15.4
26.9
32.7
21.2
25.0
13.5

D. Access to Arbitration
Mandatory arbitration effectively closes the doors to the courthouse. But
because litigation is so expensive, many plaintiffs who are not formally barred
from the courthouse find it virtually impossible to get through its doors.37
Hence, for claims involving modest amounts of money, arbitration may have no
greater tendency than court litigation to preclude access to justice. Arbitration
may, however, impose its own barriers and costs on consumers. We therefore
reviewed the collected clauses for indications of the degree to which consumers
would find it logistically feasible and affordable to arbitrate their disputes.

37. There is extensive commentary on the barriers to court access imposed by delay and expense.
See, e.g., MARK H. GITENSTEIN & ROBERT LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING
COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
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1. Initiation of Arbitration
All fifty-two clauses allow either the consumer or the business to initiate
arbitration proceedings.
2. Location of Hearings
Twenty-six of the clauses (50.0%) specify where the arbitration hearings
would be held. In all but three cases, that location was near the consumer’s
residence or where the consumer receives service. Two of the exceptions were
on-line businesses: one states that California Joe would have to go to Seattle,
Washington, to arbitrate his case; the other would send him to Baltimore,
Maryland. The other exception was a tour operator that requires that the arbitration take place in San Diego, California.
3. Fees and Other Expenses
Thirty of the fifty-two clauses (57.7%) specify, to some extent, how the
expenses of arbitration would be divided between the parties. These clauses
offer a plethora of allocation rules. The most common overarching rule (found
in thirteen of the thirty clauses that mention expenses) is that the parties will
divide the expenses of arbitration equally.38 Two additional clauses state that
the losing party will be responsible for all expenses of the prevailing party, and
another states the same but makes responsibility conditional on the arbitrators’
deeming that such an award would not cause a substantial injustice. One clause
mentions only that the non-fee portions of the arbitration expenses will be
borne equally between the parties. The thirteen remaining clauses that address
expenses refer to arbitration fees only. Three of these provide that the party
initiating the arbitration will pay the filing fee, and one provides that the party
initiating the arbitration will pay all arbitration fees. Two state that the
arbitrator will decide who is responsible for the arbitration fees. Four clauses
provide for the possibility of some reimbursement of fees by the business to the
consumer after the arbitration. One states that the prevailing party may
recover the arbitration fees from the losing party, and another implies this by
limiting the consumer’s liability to the amount of fees that would have been
paid in court. The remaining clause limits the consumer’s liability for
arbitration fees to $25 for claims of less than $1,000.
Twelve clauses (23.1%) make some provision for aiding consumers who
request assistance in paying filing, administrative, and hearing fees. Seven of
these clauses state that the business will advance, or consider advancing, all or
some portion of the fees, to be reimbursed after the arbitration. Two clauses
state that the business will pay all or a portion of the fees and arbitrator
expenses in cases of extreme financial hardship (presumably with the business
deciding what constitutes “extreme financial hardship”). Three clauses state
that the business will pay at least some portion of the consumer’s expenses.
38. One of these allows arbitrator discretion, stating that the costs of arbitration will be split
equally between the parties unless the arbitrator allocates them differently.
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One of these provides for the business to pay up to $250 toward the filing,
administrative, and hearing fees once the consumer has paid the first $50 of the
filing fee. Another states that the business will pay all provider fees, up to
$2,500, for claims asserted by the consumer, after the consumer has paid an
amount equivalent to the filing fee for such claims in the court in the consumer’s judicial district. Beyond $2,500, the business will consider paying additional provider fees, and if it does not approve the consumer’s request, and the
consumer prevails, the business will reimburse the consumer for the additional
fees. The final clause states that the business will pay the portion of the filing
fee that exceeds $50 and any administrative and hearing fees on any claim submitted by the consumer—up to a maximum of $1,500—and will consider paying
any additional provider fees.
The expense provisions are summarized in Table 7.
TABLE 7:
ARBITRATION EXPENSES MENTIONED IN CLAUSE

Mention of expenses
All expenses
Divided equally, with arbitrator discretion
Loser pays
Partial expenses
Non-fee expenses divided equally
Initiator pays filing fee
Initiator pays all arbitration fees
Arbitrator decides fee allocation
Provision for some consumer reimbursement
of fees
Loser pays some or all fees
Cap consumer’s portion of fees
Provide for indigency
No mention of expenses

Number of
Clauses
30
16
13
3
14
1
3
1
2
4
2
1
12
22

Percentage
57.7
30.8
25.0
5.8
26.9
1.9
5.8
1.9
3.8
7.7
3.8
1.9
23.1
42.3

E. Remedies
1. Limitations on Damages
Four of the fifty-two clauses (7.7%) explicitly limit consumers’ substantive
rights by placing limits on damages. A health provider’s contract states that if
the damages claimed by the consumer are less than $200,000, the arbitrator will
have no jurisdiction to award more than that. A clause in a tour operator’s contract provides that under no circumstances will the business be liable to any trip
participant for more than $500. An auto insurer’s contract states that no non-
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economic or punitive damages will be awarded. And another auto insurer’s
contract states that arbitrators may not award damages in excess of the
coverage limits.
2. Availability of Review
Twenty-one of the clauses (40.4%) explicitly state that arbitrators’ decisions
may not be challenged in court.39 Another nineteen clauses (36.5%) merely
refer to arbitration awards as “final” or “binding,” or to the arbitration itself as
“binding.” The remaining twelve clauses (23.1%) omit any reference to the
finality of the arbitration.
Generally, no opportunity for review or appeal is provided for within the
arbitration process. However, five of the credit card clauses provide that, in the
event of an award greater than $100,000, either party may appeal to a panel of
three arbitrators, who will hear the dispute de novo.
IV
CONCLUSION
Critics of arbitration pursuant to predispute contracts between consumers
and businesses have questioned whether arbitration provides the same substantive remedies and procedural protections as would be accorded by a court.40
The consumer arbitration clauses we reviewed offer mixed evidence with regard
to these concerns.
Few of the fifty-two clauses reflect the type of egregious self-dealing that has
been identified in publicized cases. Most of the clauses appear in many respects
to put consumers on equal terms with the businesses that drafted them, a key
feature if businesses are to defend successfully against claims of unconscionability. Arbitration is available at either party’s request and is held (almost
always) at a location convenient to the consumer and the business. Either party
may be represented by counsel. Either party may pursue specified means of
provisional relief. When small claims and other types of actions are exempted
from arbitration, they are exempted (almost always) for both the consumer and
the business. Discovery is limited for both parties, and the rules of evidence are
relaxed for both parties. Expenses often are split equally between consumers
and businesses. The vast majority of clauses place no limits on substantive
remedies. And the arbitrator’s decision is equally binding on both parties.
These terms suggest prima facie that businesses are placing consumers on equal
footing with themselves in resolving any future disputes.
A closer look at the clauses sampled, however, suggests that there are
grounds for concern. For example, if consumers challenge business practices,
limitations on discovery will disadvantage them more than the businesses, as the
39. Four of these refer to possible exceptions under the Federal Arbitration Act and state law,
without explaining what those exceptions might be.
40. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996).
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businesses will hold most of the relevant information. If filing, administrative,
and hearing fees add significantly to transaction costs, this burden will fall disproportionately on the (ordinarily less financially able) consumer, even when
such fees are split equally. Class actions, which are almost exclusively used by
consumers against businesses, are often precluded.41 The nature of the interim
relief provided for is more suited to the business than the consumer. And the
types of claims exempted from arbitration tend to be those brought by businesses against consumers. In sum, the appearance of a level playing field
between the parties may be deceptive.
Moreover, this study provides little basis for believing that consumers are
making informed decisions when they “agree” to arbitrate in predispute arbitration clauses. More than a third of the clauses obtained fail to inform consumers
that they are waiving their right to litigate disputes in court. A fifth of the
clauses do not explicitly state that the outcome of arbitration is final and binding. More than a third do not provide consumers with any information regarding the expenses they should expect to incur in an arbitration proceeding.
Many clauses are silent on key aspects of arbitration, such as arbitrator qualifications and selection or the rules of discovery and evidence. And almost a third
of clauses fail to state what organization will provide the arbitration. Moreover,
to be fully informed of the features of the arbitration to which they are “agreeing,” consumers would need to review the applicable provider rules, a daunting
task (made impossible when the arbitration provider is not named in the
clause).
The Supreme Court has stated that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements
as they see fit.”42 This view is not supported by the results of the present study.
Given the lack of information available to consumers in predispute arbitration
clauses, and the difficulty of obtaining and deciphering these clauses, it is likely
that most consumers only become aware of what rights they retain and what
41. The concern with class action preclusion is illustrated in Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002). According to the California Court of Appeals,
Although styled as a mutual prohibition on representative or class actions, it is difficult to
envision the circumstances under which [a class action preclusion] provision might negatively
impact [the business], because credit card companies typically do not sue their customers in
class action lawsuits. This provision is clearly meant to prevent customers, such as Szetela and
those he seeks to represent, from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, such
as the $29 sought by Szetela. Fully aware that few customers will go to the time and trouble of
suing in small claims court, Discover has instead sought to create for itself virtual immunity
from class or representative actions despite their potential merit, while suffering no similar
detriment to its own rights.
Id. This excerpt also conveys the more general concern that terms that appear facially neutral, avoiding
claims of unconscionability, may, in reality, gravely disadvantage the consumer.
Class action preclusion also occurs in provider rules. The NAF, for example, has marketed its services to businesses as a means of eliminating class actions and improving businesses’ bottom lines. See
Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: ‘You Can’t Sue Us”; Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers
from Taking Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at A1.
42. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
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rights they have waived after disputes arise.43 Moreover, given the frequency
with which these clauses are used in some industries, consumers are often in a
poor position to negotiate terms or seek services or products from other businesses. The prevalence of arbitration rules that subtly or more strongly tilt the
playing field in the business’s favor provides grounds for concern about how
consumers actually fare in arbitration. In summary, the evidence to date suggests that there is little reason to believe consumer arbitration is—in the conjecture of the Court—only another forum.44

43. One potential explanation for the lack of arbitration clauses by medical providers in the study
is that California law requires arbitration clauses concerning medical malpractice to be more elaborate,
explicit, and salient than arbitration clauses generally. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 611 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a)-(b)).
44. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).

